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Today reactor neutrino experiments are at the cutting edge of fundamental research in particle
physics. Understanding the neutrino is far from complete, but thanks to the impressive progress in
this field over the last 15 years, a few research groups are seriously considering that neutrinos could be
useful for society. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) works with its Member States
to promote safe, secure and peaceful nuclear technologies. In a context of international tension
and nuclear renaissance, neutrino detectors could help IAEA to enforce the Treaty on the Non-
Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). In this article we discuss a futuristic neutrino application to
detect and localize an undeclared nuclear reactor from across borders. The SNIFa concept proposes
to use a few hundred thousand tons neutrino detectors to unveil clandestine fission reactors. Beyond
previous studies we provide estimates of all known background sources as a function of the detector’s
longitude, latitude and depth, and we discuss how they impact the detectability.
I. NEUTRINOS AND PROLIFERATION
In a context of increasing carbon-free emission energy
needs, civilian nuclear energy will probably expand all
over the world. Globalization, as well as the goal of en-
ergy independence, led to an increase of the list of coun-
tries aiming to acquire technological know-how in the
field of nuclear energy. As a consequence of the spread
of practical knowledge, the possibility of diverting a nu-
clear facility towards non-civilian use could increase in
the next 50 years. The main duty of the United Nations’
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is to work
to make sure that nations use nuclear energy only for
peaceful purposes [1]. Apart from political difficulties re-
garding safeguards, the efficiency of IAEA controls may
be limited by monitoring techniques in the future due
to the fast growth of nuclear facilities around the world.
Since 2003, the Department of Safeguards of the Inter-
national Atomic Energy Agency has been evaluating the
potential applicability of neutrino detection technologies
for safeguard purposes.
In 2008, a transverse working group of reactor neu-
trino experts from the Member States together with the
IAEA Division of Technical Support (SGTS) firmly es-
tablished that neutrino detectors have unique abilities to
non intrusively monitor a nuclear reactor’s operational
status, power and fissile content in real-time, from out-
side the reactor containment. This led to the definition of
three safeguards scenarios of interest. The first two, the
confirmation of the absence of unrecorded production of
fissile material in declared reactors and the estimation of
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the total burn-up of a reactor core, are related to the so-
called near-field applications with detectors located a few
tens of meters from the core. The third scenario concerns
clandestine or undeclared nuclear reactor detection with
core-detector distances ranging from tens to hundreds of
kilometers, also known as far-field applications.
As far as near-field monitoring is concerned, a few de-
tectors specifically built for safeguards have shown ro-
bust, long term measurements of these metrics in actual
installations at operating power reactors [2, 3]. Several
experimental programs [6] are currently being carried out
in Brazil, France, Italy, Japan, Russia and the United
States, guided by IAEA inputs on their needs at specific
reactors. Over a longer time scale, it has been recognized
that neutrino detectors could have a considerable value in
bulk process and safeguards by design approaches for new
and next generation reactors. Concerning far-field appli-
cations, an undeclared reactor operating secretly would
stand out in the received ν¯e. Such a detection possibil-
ity has already been discussed in [4, 5], using a network
of gigantic water Cherenkov detectors (of 1 million tons
each) being deployed below four kilometers of water in
deep oceans.
The purpose of this article is to address the possibil-
ity of detecting undeclared nuclear reactors across bor-
ders with very large neutrino detectors, outlining basic
principles and figures regarding the deployment of large
neutrino detectors as a safeguard tool.
Our study revisits the detectability of clandestine nu-
clear reactors with a comprehensive treatement of known
neutrino sources and backgrounds. In this article we con-
sider as a baseline case a 1034 free protons liquid scintilla-
tor detector fitting inside an oil supertanker. The strat-
egy presented in this article is to deploy one or more of
these detectors as close as possible to a suspicious area,
typically between 100 and 500 km. The detectors are
2then temporarily sunk underwater for data taking until
a significant amount of events are detected. Our baseline
operating time is 6 months.
We will first introduce the reactor neutrino field in sec-
tion II. In section III we review the neutrino technology
and we outline the detector design in section IV. We
then compute the known neutrino sources (section V)
and backgrounds (section VI). We then establish the
rogue activity detection criteria in section VII. In sec-
tion VI we study non-neutrino backgrounds in order to
derive and possibly relax the minimum operation depth
with respect to previous studies [5]. We also provide a
method for determining the location of an undeclared
reactor (section VIII). We conclude by addressing the
feasibility of the concept within the next thirty years.
II. REACTOR NEUTRINOS
A. Neutrino production
Fission reactors are prodigious producers of neutrinos,
emitting about 1021 ν¯e s
−1 GW−1th . In this article we
will only consider the electron antineutrinos emitted by
β-decays, referred to simply as neutrinos in the rest of
the text. In actual light water reactors, the Uranium
fuel is enriched to a few percent in 235U. The fission of
235,238U and 239,241Pu isotopes produces neutron rich nu-
clei which must shed neutrons to approach the valley of
stability. The beta decays of these fission products pro-
duce approximately six electron antineutrinos per fission.
Measurements for 235U and 239,241Pu and theoretical cal-
culations for 238U are used to evaluate the ν¯e spectrum
[8–10]. Since 238U only contributes to about 11% of the
neutrino signal, and further since the error associated is
less than 10%, 238U contributes less than 1% to the over-
all uncertainty in the ν¯e flux. The overall normalization
is known to about 1.4% [11] and its shape to about 2%
[12]. As a nuclear reactor operates, the proportions of the
fissile elements evolve with time. During a typical fuel cy-
cle the Pu concentrations increase, so the total neutrino
flux decreases with time. As an approximation we use
a typical averaged fuel composition during a reactor cy-
cle corresponding to the following fission fractions: 235U
(55.6%), 239Pu (32.6%), 238U (7.1%) and 241Pu (4.7%).
B. Neutrino oscillations
There is now compelling evidence for flavor conver-
sion, also known as oscillations, of atmospheric, solar,
reactor and accelerator neutrinos [16–22]. Thus reactor
neutrino experiments measure a rate weighted by the sur-
vival probability P (ν¯e → ν¯e) of the ν¯e emitted by nuclear
power stations at a distance (L), resulting in a deviation
from the 1/L2 dependence that would otherwise be ex-
pected.
Reactor neutrino oscillations depend on the atmo-
spheric ∆m231 and the solar ∆m
2
21 mass splittings be-
tween the three neutrino mass eigenstates, as well as the
three mixing angles θ12, θ23, and the small, still unde-
termined θ13 [23]. In this article, we consider minimum
baselines of about 100 km. Because ∆m2sol ≪ ∆m
2
atm
and because of the smallness of θ13, the oscillation prob-
ability can be approximated by:
1−P (ν¯e → ν¯e) = sin
2(2θ12) sin
2
(
1.27
∆m221[eV
2]L[m]
Eν¯e [MeV]
)
For energies above 1.8 MeV, the survival probability is
close to 1 for distances of 0 to several tens of kilometers.
The survival probability then oscillates around an asymp-
totic value of 0.57 as the distance ranges from about
50 km to 300 km. At further distances, much larger
than the ’solar-driven’ oscillation length, the probabil-
ity is practically very close to 0.57. In this work we treat
neutrino oscillation with the state-of-the-art three neu-
trino oscillations formula [23], but we set θ13 to 0 since
its small value will not impact the oscillation probability
for the purpose of this study.
Because of the combination of MeV range energies and
baselines less than 103 km the modification of the oscil-
lation probability induced by the coherent forward scat-
tering from matter electrons is less than a few percent.
In this work the effect is small enough to be neglected.
C. Neutrino rate
The mean energy released 〈Ef 〉 per fission is around
205 MeV [24]. The energy-weighted cross section to de-
tect neutrinos amounts to 〈σf 〉 = 5.8 × 10
−43 cm2 per
fission. The reactor thermal power (Pth) is related to
the number of fissions per second (Nf ) by Nf = 6.24 ×
1018 s−1 Pth[MW]/ 〈Ef 〉 [MeV]. The neutrino interaction
rate (RL) at a distance L from the source, assuming no
neutrino oscillations, is then RL = Nf 〈σf 〉np/(4piL
2),
where np is the number of hydrogen atoms, or free pro-
tons, of the target. The expected neutrino rate from
clandestine reactors at a few hundred kilometers is quite
small, due to the weak neutrino interaction cross section
and the 1/L2 dependence. Neglecting neutrino oscilla-
tions, a 100 MWth reactor would induce 450 events per
year in a 1034 proton detector at a distance of 100 km.
In this particular case, neutrino oscillations induce a de-
viation from the 1/L2 dependence and only 250 neutrino
events could effectively be detected as shown on Figure 1.
Therefore the target mass must at least be of the order
of a hundred thousand tons. For fundamental research,
neutrino detectors as large as 50,000 tons have been built
[16]. A few projects of larger liquid scintillators detectors,
like [39, 45], are currently being discussed.
3FIG. 1. Number of events detected in 1 year in a detector
with 1034 protons, as a function of the distance from a single
100 MW reactor. The dashed line shows the variation in the
absence of neutrino oscillations, while the full line shows the
actual observation taking into account oscillations. From 50
km to 100 km a caracteristic ’wiggle’ can be seen. Beyond
250 km, oscillations simply cause a reduction in the flux, but
the 1/L2 dependence is restored.
D. Clandestine reactors
We define clandestine or rogue reactors as nuclear reac-
tors not declared by a country to the international com-
munity (IAEA). Like regular research or power reactors
they would be copious sources of neutrinos. We assume
such reactors to have the same features as regular reac-
tors, though their nuclear thermal power is unknown. In
this article we will consider that clandestine reactors may
have powers between 10 MWth to 2 GWth. We consider
the fuel composition of clandestine reactors to be similar
to the composition of commercial reactors, on average.
This assumption has no strong impact on the detectabil-
ity of clandestine activity since the neutrino rate depends
mainly on the thermal power.
III. NEUTRINO DETECTION
Electron antineutrinos can be detected via inverse beta
decay on free protons: ν¯e + p → e
+ + n for Eν¯e >
Ethr ∼ 1.8 MeV, and their energy is derived from the
measured positron kinetic energy as Eν¯e ≃ Ee+ + Ethr.
We call visible energy the energy deposited in the detec-
tor, corresponding to Evis = Ee+ + 2me. The inverse
beta decay cross section has been precisely computed in
[7]. A neutrino event is thus characterized by a prompt
positron event which deposits a visible energy between 1
and 8 MeV, followed by a delayed gamma event arising
from neutron capture within τ ∼ 10− 200 µs. The min-
imal energy of 1 MeV of the prompt event is caused by
the positron’s annihilation in the active volume. Prompt
and delayed event are spatially correlated, within< 1 m3.
They both have a β/γ-type pulse shape, distinguishable
in liquid scintillators. This signature allows to discrimi-
nate efficiently against backgrounds.
Water-Cherenkov and liquid scintillator detectors al-
low real-time spectroscopy of electron antineutrinos.
Liquid scintillators have commonly been used for the
past 60 years to detect neutrinos using the inverse β-
decay reaction. The hydrogen atoms serve as targets to
neutrinos, producing ionizing particles. The liquid scin-
tillator emits light in the UV-range when crossed by these
charged particles. These liquids can be flammable or dan-
gerous to the environment and thus require special care
when large amounts are handled. The inverse beta-decay
reaction does not allow to recover the direction of the
incoming neutrino, apart from a slight backward shift
of the positron angular distribution. The scintillation
light, isotropically emitted, allows to find the position
of the neutrino interaction within a few tens of centime-
ters. Large volume detectors may yield a few hundred
photoelectrons per deposited MeV, corresponding to an
energy resolution of a few percent even for the less en-
ergetic neutrinos. This detection technology based on
liquid scintillator has the capability to measure the full
ν¯e spectrum since the instrumental threshold may be low-
ered to 1 MeV or less, depending on backgrounds.
High purity water is also used as a detection medium
for charged particles traveling through at super-luminous
speed [16], inducing so-called Cherenkov radiation. Wa-
ter has a few advantages: it is straightforward to handle,
non flammable, non toxic, available in large volumes at
relatively low cost, and easily purified by common tech-
niques to improve its transparency. For charged parti-
cles above an energy threshold (0.78 MeV for electrons)
only 200 UV photons/cm are emitted along the track,
i.e. roughly 30 times less light than liquid scintillators.
Similarly this detection technique cannot be used to de-
termine the direction of the incoming neutrino.
For both technologies, doping the liquid with Gadolin-
ium at the level of 1–5 g/l can greatly improve the sensi-
tivity to electron antineutrinos from reactors. The large
cross section for neutron capture on 157Gd (2.59 105 barn)
and 155Gd (6.1 104 barn) enhances the sensitivity to the
delayed neutron signal. The positron, emitting scintilla-
tion photons or radiating Cherenkov photons, is immedi-
ately detected with or without Gadolinium. However the
neutron, quickly thermalized in the hydrogen-rich media,
is captured on Gd with a probability of more than 80%.
Upon capturing a neutron, a Gadolinium nucleus relaxes
to its ground state by emitting a cascade of gamma rays
having a total energy of about 8 MeV, thus enhancing the
detection efficiency. This is especially true in water where
the neutron capture signal on hydrogen, at 2.2 MeV, is
barely detectable above backgrounds. Furthermore the
time delay between the positron and neutron events is
significantly decreased, leading to a reduction of acciden-
tal backgrounds. Unlike Gadolinium-doped water, stable
Gadolinium-doped liquid scintillators are difficult to ob-
4tain, but we assume that current technologies being de-
veloped for the next generation of experiments [15] will
be routinely available thirty years from now.
In both cases visible-UV light is collected by photo-
multiplier tubes covering the walls of the detector vessel.
The total charge and photon arrival times allow to re-
construct the incident neutrino’s energy and interaction
time.
IV. DETECTOR DESIGN
In this section we briefly describe our baseline detec-
tor design and address the technical challenges in real-
izing a SNIF detector module. Our design concept is
similar to those developed for large neutrino detectors
proposed for fundamental research, such as Titand [38],
Hano-Hano [39] and LENA [45].
We consider a detector module containing 1034
free protons (fiducial volume). This corresponds to
138,000 tons of linearalkylbenzene (LAB,C18H30) based
liquid scintillator, contained in a volume of 160,000 m3
(density of 0.86). This could be hosted in a cylindri-
cal tank of 23 m radius and 96.5 m length. Optical
coverage of the detector walls of 20 percent would re-
quire 17,000 photomultipliers of the Superkamiokande
type (20 inches). Depending on the total muon rate in
the module, and thus on the operating depth, the fiducial
volume could be optically segmented. This huge detec-
tor module has to be designed to be transportable and
deployable in the deep ocean. We propose to host the de-
tector in a supertanker to be transported on the detection
site. By comparison, a modern supertanker can have a
capacity of over 400,000 deadweight tons. It would then
be immersed at a depth of a several hundred to several
thousand meters.
In the rest of the article we will focus our discussion
on liquid scintillator technology. The components of the
detector are embedded in each other, the liquid scintil-
lator being in the central volume. Linearalkylbenzene
is currently used in neutrino experiments (for instance
SNO+ [26], Double Chooz [27], Daya Bay [28]) because
of its good optical transparency (> 20 m), its high light
yield, its low amount of radioactive impurities, and its
high flash point (140 degrees Celsius) which makes safe
handling easier. Moreover experimental studies of tem-
perature and pressure dependence validated its perfor-
mance in deep underwater environment [39].
Scintillator timing properties as well as optical trans-
parency are improved by adding a combination of solutes,
typically PPO (a few g/l) and bisMSB (a few mg/l). In
addition, the neutron capture capability of the scintilla-
tor would be greatly enhanced with the dissolution of a
Gadolinium complex (a few g/l typically). This should be
considered as a serious option if long term stability issues
are solved. It would require dedicated surface treatement
of the inner walls, such as Teflon coating.
Such a liquid scintillator medium would lead to 80%
neutrino detection efficiency. Setting an analysis thresh-
old at Evis > 2.6 MeV would greatly reduce the material
radiopurity constraints, simplifying industrial production
of the modules (see Section VIA). We thus consider this
energy cut in our baseline scenario, and account for the
resulting loss of efficiency.
In order to further reduce backgrounds the inner stain-
less steel tank could be enclosed in another steel vessel
providing a protective layer of ultra pure water against
external radioactivity. This 1 meter thick region could be
equiped with phototubes detecting Cherenkov light from
cosmic muons, allowing to further suppress the muon-
induced background (see Section VIC 2). This would
imply the installation of 4,000 additional phototubes on
the outer tank walls.
The geometry of both tanks should be curved to ac-
commodate the deep-sea hydrostatic pressure. The de-
tector should finally be zero-buoyant to be sunk into the
deep ocean for its operation and to be brought back to
the surface for maintenance or redeployment elsewhere.
V. KNOWN NEUTRINO SOURCES
In this section we review the two largest sources
of known neutrinos. These sources are an irreducible
background for the search of undeclared nuclear cores:
power/research reactor neutrinos and geological neutri-
nos. As a first step the known sources neutrino signal
should be subtracted from the observed rate to unveil
undeclared nuclear fission activity.
A. World nuclear power stations
Clandestine reactor and commercial reactor neutrinos
are totally indistinguishable. Neutrinos from commer-
cial plants are thus an irreducible source of background
that could overwhelm the clandestine signal. However
this background is predictable since the IAEA can ac-
cess all power plants’ geographical coordinates, thermal
power, and operating status at any time. In our simu-
lation, we included 201 nuclear power stations, most of
them having multiple units. They amount to 1,134 GWth
total thermal power. The reactor’s latitude and longi-
tude were checked to a precision of one hundredth of a
degree, using satellite views via Google Earth R©. The
mean load factor of each reactor for the 1998-2008 pe-
riod has been included when possible. We consider that
the global power is stable, though reactors will be turn-
ing on and off for refueling and maintenance. We assume
that the day-by-day thermal power would be knowable
by the monitoring authorities, with a 3% uncertainty.
This is consistent with what present day experiments,
KamLAND and Borexino, are able to achieve [31, 37].
We also assume an averaged isotopic composition for all
cores known within 3% uncertainty.
5200
200
200
200
20
0
200
300
300
300
300
30
0
300
300
30
0
40
0
400
400 4
00
400
400
40
0
4 0
400 400
500
500
500
500
500
500
50
0
50
75
0
750
750
750
75
0
75
0
750
750
100
0
1000
1000
1000
1000
20
00
2000
2000
2000
300
0
3000
3000
3000
400
0
4000
4000
4000
500
05000
50
00
5000
10
00
10
00
0
100
00
longitude (°)
la
tit
ud
e 
(°)
 
 
−180 −120 −60 0 60 120 180
−90
−60
−30
0
30
60
90
100
200
300
400
500
600
700
800
900
1000
FIG. 2. Maps illustrating the number of neutrino events that would be detected in a 1034 free protons detector (Evis > 2.6 MeV,
4,000 m operating depth) after half a year of data taking. 201 nuclear power stations have been included, accounting for a
78% global load factor on averaged. This map includes all non-neutrino backgrounds which are negligible at this depth in the
northern hemisphere (see Section VI).
The number of events detected in 6 months in a SNIF
detector module as a function of geographical position
on Earth is shown on Figure 2. Most of the commercial
nuclear power stations are located in the northern hemi-
sphere, mainly belonging to developed countries, espe-
cially the United States of America, Europe, and Japan.
These three zones gather more than 85% of the total
world nuclear power budget. Only four power stations
are present in the southern hemisphere, in Argentina,
Brazil, and South Africa, amounting to only 14 GWth.
This asymmetry plays an important role in the sensitivity
of the neutrino method. Obviously it is harder to detect
clandestine activity in areas where commercial and/or
research reactor activity is high.
In this work we consider only power reactors with ther-
mal power greater than 100 MWth, and we do not ac-
count for research reactors. This is justified because the
total power produced by commercial nuclear reactors is
far greater than that of research reactors. Though this as-
sumption is correct for most locations around the world,
it may be locally inexact in some areas with no power
stations.
B. Geoneutrinos
Geoneutrinos are natural electron antineutrinos aris-
ing from the decay of radioactive isotopes of Uranium,
Thorium, and Potassium in the crust and mantle of
the Earth. The spectrum of neutrinos from the decay
chains of Uranium and Thorium extends above the en-
ergy threshold for inverse neutron decay (1.8 MeV) to
the maximum geologic neutrino energy (3.27 MeV), cor-
responding to a 2.5 MeV visible energy deposition in a
liquid scintillator detector. Potassium neutrinos are be-
low threshold for this reaction. For the current study we
used a 2◦× 2◦ map providing the Uranium and Thorium
geoneutrino fluxes based on the Earth reference Model
in [40]. Geoneutrino fluxes are computed following the
prescription described in [41], at the detector’s longitude
and latitude coordinates, taking neutrino oscillations into
account. The geoneutrino background rate ranges from
a few hundred interactions per 1034 H.year in the mid-
dle of the oceans (thin oceanic crust), to a few thousand
interactions per 1034 H.year in the middle of the conti-
nents (thick continental crust). A possibility to discard
this background completely is to set an analysis threshold
above 2.5 MeV. Another possible source of background
a hypothetical natural nuclear reactor of a few TW in
the core of the Earth [42]. In our study we neglect its
potential influence.
6VI. NON-NEUTRINO BACKGROUNDS
Irreducible commercial reactor neutrinos are not the
only source of backgrounds. Non-neutrino backgrounds
could prevent any neutrino detection if not handled care-
fully since the expected low signal (clandestine minus
known activity) must not be drowned in a high rate of
background events. This implies extensive passive shield-
ing to protect the fiducial volume from natural radioac-
tivity, as well as active shielding to veto cosmic rays.
In addition a thickness of hundreds to thousands meters
of water is mandatory to achieve sufficient supression of
atmospheric muons, neutrons and cosmogenic radioiso-
topes. In this section we review the available detection
technologies. We then provide a model for the three main
kinds of non-neutrino backgrounds: accidental coinci-
dences, fast neutrons and the long-lived muon induced
isotopes 9Li/8He, as a function of the operating depth.
A. Accidental backgrounds
When detecting neutrinos, naturally occurring ra-
dioactivity (U, Th, K) of the component of the detector
may create fake signal - so-called accidental background
- defined as a coincidence of a prompt energy deposition
between 1 and 10 MeV, followed by a delayed neutron-
like event, occurring after a delay τd of a few hundredths
of a millisecond, in close proximity to the prompt energy
deposit (within a volume Vd ∼ 1m
3). With these no-
tations, the accidental background rate racc is given by
racc ∼ rp rd τd Vd Vdet, where rp and rd are the specific
background rates (in units of s−1m−3) for the prompt
and the delayed signal, respectively. Vdet is the total de-
tection volume.
The potentially most dangerous of these backgrounds
are those caused by radioactive impurities within the ac-
tive detection liquid. The use of standard techniques like
distillation, water extraction, nitrogen purging, and col-
umn chromatography allows to achieve sufficiently low
concentrations in radio–impurities [29, 30]. The detec-
tion liquid is contained in a vessel and photomultipliers
catch the light emitted in the neutrino interaction. Those
materials and equipments also contain radioactive im-
purities whose decay products may release their energy
within the liquids. The selection of high purity materials
entering the detector (mechanical structures, photomul-
tiplier tubes) as well as passive shielding provide an effi-
cient tool against this type of background. Surface/wall-
induced events could be rejected through spatial recon-
struction cuts, with a loss of fiducial volume however.
Taking accidental backgrounds into account leads to the
detector design presented in Section IV. In Table I we
present our background rescaling results. We use the rp
and rd values measured in Borexino and KamLAND, thus
the accidental background rate in SNIF scales with Vdet
only. We rescale the estimated rates for a 1034 H.y (pro-
ton.year) target immersed in deep water (SNIF baseline
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FIG. 3. Background rate as a function of the detector depth
in meters of water equivalent for an exposure of 1034 H.year.
Fast neutron and cosmogenic backgrounds are estimated with
the models presented in sections VIC2 and VIC1. For
comparison we indicate our estimates of accidental back-
grounds for two different thresholds, 1 and 2.6 MeV (visi-
ble energy). We also give three possible estimates for the
geoneutrino rates, for continental crust areas (high), coastal
areas (medium), and oceanic crust areas (low) [39]. Known
neutrino sources under three hypotheses are also displayed for
comparison (see section V).
design). Choosing the Borexino extrapolation providing
the lowest estimate, we note the accidental background
dominates the cosmogenics backgrounds at depths below
2,000 m, as displayed on Figure 3. This choice is justified
assuming a detector as radiopure as Borexino could be
achievable at the SNIF scale within the next 30 years.
Considering no scaling of the delayed signal background
may be too simplistic, however. In order to get a more
robust result in our current study we get rid of the ac-
cidental background contribution by setting an analysis
threshold Evis > 2.6 MeV. This implies a loss of signal
statistics of 28%, but it also relaxes the radiopurity con-
straints by orders of magnitude, simplifying the project
feasibility.
B. Cosmic muons induced dead time
The cosmic-ray muon flux underwater can be deduced
from data at different depths and extrapolated as a
function of equivalent water depth where 105 g/cm2
= 1,000 mwe (meters of water equivalent). Using the
depth–intensity relation for the total muon flux with a
flat overburden given in [35], we derive the muon rate in
a detector containing 1034 free protons having a section
exposed to muons of 1.48 108 cm2 (cylinder of r=23 m
radius and l=96.5 m length). At water depths of 500 m,
1,000 m, 2,000 m, and 4,000 m we obtain a muon rate
7Experiment KamLAND Borexino SNIF extrapolated from
Label KamLAND & Borexino
Flat eq. depth 2,050 m 3,050 m 2,500 m
Scintillator C11.4H21.6 C9H12 C16H30
H/m3 6.60 1028 5.30 1028 6.24 1028
C/m3 3.35 1028 3.97 1028 3.79 1028
density 0.78 0.88 0.86
Mass (tons) 912 278 138,000
Volume (m3) 1170 316 160,000
Radius (m) 6.5 4.25 23
Cyl. Length (m) — — 96.5
µ−Section (cm2) 1.3 106 0.57 106 4.4 107
µ−Flux (cm−2s−1) 1.6 10−7 0.3 10−7 0.7 10−7
µ−Energy (MeV) 219 276 247
µ−Rate (s−1) 2.13 10−1 1.6 10−2 3.0
µ−DT (200 µs) 4 10−5 0.3 10−5 60 10−5
Co-DT (200 ms) 4 10−2 0.3 10−2 60 10−2
Exposure (H.y) 2.44 1032 6.02 1030 1034
Threshold (MeV) 0.9 1 0.9 1
Accidental Rate 80.5±0.1 0.08±0.001 3,300±4 133±2
Li/He Rate 7.0±1 0.03±0.02 85.9±12.2 108±71.9
Fast n Rate 9±9 0.025±0.025 171±17 93.4±9
Geo-ν 69.7 2.5±0.2 2,860 4,150±332
Reactor-ν 1,609±51 5.7±0.3 65,900±2,080 9,460±498
TABLE I. Breakdown of the background estimates for SNIF. We consider two different background measurements from the
KamLAND and Borexino neutrino searches [31, 37]; Cosmogenics from KamLAND are rescaled from [32]. µ−DT and Co-DT
are the estimates of both muon and cosmogenics induced dead time (DT). The flat equivalent depths are taken from [35].
Extrapolation to SNIF corresponds to a 1034 proton detector operating for 1 year at a depth of 2,500 m, according to the
prescription given in [34, 35]. In this table, SNIF is taken to be located at the KamLAND/Borexino sites to calculate Geo-
and Reactor-neutrino backgrounds. Geo-neutrino rates are measured, in agreement with the reference Earth model [44].
of 560, 110, 8, 0.3 Hz, respectively. Vetoing the detector
for 200 µs after each muon would thus lead to respec-
tive muon-induced dead times of 11%, 2.2%, 0.15%, and
0.006%. From this data we derive the minimum operat-
ing depth our module at around 0.5 km, not yet account-
ing for background. We include this depth-dependent
dead time in our sensitivity estimates. Reducing the de-
tector’s dead time at shallower depth is possible by subdi-
viding the module in optically decoupled compartments.
C. Correlated backgrounds
Cosmic ray muons will be the dominating trigger rate
at the depth of our detectors. Their very high energy
deposition corresponds to about 2 MeV per centimeter
path length and provides thus a strong discrimination
tool. They induce the main source of dangerous events,
cosmogenic activity and fast neutrons, which mimic the
neutrino signal.
1. Muon induced cosmogenic activity
Energetic muons can interact with carbon nuclei and
produce by spallation radioactive isotopes such as 8He,
9Li and 11Li. These nuclei are unstable and decay emit-
ting an electron and a neutron, thus perfectly mimicking
the signal from an antineutrino interaction ; moreover the
long lifetimes of these nuclei, a few 100 ms, complicate
the task of identifying them since they occur long after
the muons that created them. This background is consid-
ered to be the most serious difficulty to overcome in the
SNIF concept, and drives the operating depth of the de-
tector. When this background is reduced - roughly below
3,500 m of water - 8He, 9Li and 11Li decays could be iden-
tified through a four-fold coincidence (µ → n → β → n)
characteristic signature.
In order to estimate the cosmogenic backgrounds we
used the rates experimentally measured by the Kam-
land [32] and Borexino [37] collaborations. The main
detector features as well as muon induced backgrounds
are provided in Table I. The production rate of cos-
mogenic radioisotopes is proportional to the muon flux
(Φµ), the cross section σtot(Eµ) ∼ E
0.73
µ [34], and the
total number of carbon nuclei. We start from the muon
flux predictions at the flat equivalent overburden of the
KamLAND (2050 m of water equivalent) and Borexino
(3,050 m of water equivalent) locations. We then rescale
the backgrounds to 1034 H.year for different depths ac-
cording to the total muon flux, and energy formulae given
in [35]. Estimates are corrected according to the different
carbon composition in Borexino, KamLAND and SNIF
liquid scintillators. Results for a 1034 H.year target de-
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FIG. 4. Maps illustrating the neutrino and non-neutrino background events that would be detected in a 1034 free protons
detector (1 MeV energy threshold), operating for half a year at a depth of 2,500 m. At distances greater than 1,000 kilometers
from nuclear power station clusters, the rate is dominated by geoneutrino events (see Section VB). This background could be
rejected by setting an analysis threshold Evis > 2.6 MeV.
ployed at a depth of 2,500 m are presented in Table I. An
additional selection of events with Evis > 2.6 MeV would
reject 23% of the cosmogenic background, according to
the simple spectrum shape presented in [36]. In this work
we envisage a further possibility of eradicating the cos-
mogenics backgrounds by vetoing the detector after each
muon for a long enough time. We veto a 3-m-radius cylin-
der around each muon track for 600 ms (3 times the 8He,
9Li decay time periods). Neglecting the veto inefficiency
we find that this technique could only be effective at op-
erating depth greater than 1,500 m to preserve a dead
time below 10% in a 138,000 ton detector. We thus ne-
glect the cosmogenics backgrounds from this depth on.
Below 1,500 m we considered the KamLAND rescaling
from [32]. The evolution of the predicted cosmogenics
background in SNIF with respect to the detector depth
is presented on Figure 3.
For completeness we note that a water Cherenkov de-
tector is less affected by this specific background [33] be-
cause of the lower yield of these nuclei when spallation
reactions occur with oxygen nuclei.
2. Muon induced fast neutron activity
An important source of background comes from neu-
trons produced in the surrounding of the detector by cos-
mic ray muon induced hadronic cascades. The difficulty
is that the primary cosmic ray muon may not penetrate
the detector, being thus invisible. This is especially true
for a small detector. These processes produce arbitrarily
high energy neutrons inducing proton recoils mimicking
the prompt signal, and then producing the coincident
neutron signal after thermalization and capture. Such a
sequence can mimic a ν¯e event. At several hundred me-
ters of water equivalent, muon-induced neutron produc-
tion can be fairly well estimated from the results of pre-
vious underground experiments, like KamLAND [31] and
Borexino [37]. Fast neutrons can indeed be produced by
muons either crossing the inner stainless steel vessel or in-
teracting in the water around the detector. We estimate
the rate of fast neutrons by scaling the KamLAND and
Borexino results according to the procedure described in
Section VIC1. Results for a 1034 proton.year target de-
ployed at a depth of 2,500 m are presented in Table I. An
additonal selection of events with Evis > 2.6 MeV would
reject 31% of the fast neutrons background, assuming a
flat energy spectrum.
For SNIF we only consider the case of Borexino and
we reduce the neutron production from the rock (4/5 of
the total rate) by a factor of 2.7 in order to correct for
the lower density of water. Contrary to smaller detectors
like KamLAND and Borexino, in very large detectors like
SNIF the fast neutron background could be considered
9as a surface background. We thus assume that the fast
neutrons induced by muons crossing the bulk of the de-
tector could be perfectly tagged in a very large liquid
scintillator detector (neglecting tiny veto inefficiencies).
The dominant fast neutron component induced by the
water surrounding the detector can only be detected at
distances less than 3 meters from the detector inner ves-
sel walls. Further inside the detector fast neutrons will
have been significantly slowed. This lowers the estimated
background by 70%. The evolution of our predicted fast
neutron rate with respect to the detector depth is de-
picted on Figure 3. We assume an uncertainty of 10%,
achievable within the next 30 years.
VII. DETECTING A CLANDESTINE ACTIVITY
In this section we detail the statistical method used
to decide whether a signal of undeclared activity is seen
above the known sources and backgrounds, at a given
confidence level.
A. Defining a decision threshold
Let b be the background, i.e. the average number of
events occurring in the detector in the absence of any
clandestine activity. Either from past measurements, or
theoretical calculations or other input, b is known with a
certain uncertainty σb. We will treat this error as Gaus-
sian. Now let o be the number of events actually observed
in the detector. The first question one can ask is whether
o is compatible with a fluctuation of the background, or
whether it is too high and could therefore be a sign of sus-
picious activity. This is a well known problem, studied in
great details in e.g. [43]. We will simply reproduce some
of the explanations and calculations therein. Following
Currie’s notation, we will write LC the decision thresh-
old or critical level : it is the observed number of events
above which the operator will declare having observed a
positive signal, i.e. detected a possible clandestine re-
actor. Of course this level depends on the rate of false
alarms (incorrect reported detection while no clandestine
reactor is present, also known as type I error) that one is
willing to tolerate a priori.
In the absence of any clandestine reactor, o follows a
Gaussian distribution, with mean b and error
√
b+ σ2b .
Given a certain confidence level α,
o < b+ kα
√
b+ σ2b ,
where kα is the α quantile of the normal distribution.
Consequently,
LC = kα
√
b+ σ2b . (1)
If, having observed o events, o−b > LC , then the detector
will report the presence of a clandestine reactor, with a
pre-determined false alarm rate 1− α.
This criterion has the advantage of being directly ap-
plicable to data, and is used to make a decision on
whether to take further action. It depends solely on the
mean and uncertainty on the background, and the cho-
sen confidence level. Note that at this stage there is no
localization of the detector. The purpose of LC is to
decide whether the observation signals suspicious activ-
ity or not. With the definition above, LC is a number
of events. If the distance from the reactor is known, LC
can be converted to a power (see section II C): this power
is the maximum power that would yield a signal consis-
tent with the background. We will often convert LC to
either power or distance in what follows. Conversely, if
the power of the clandestine reactor is known, we can use
the considerations of section II C to convert LC to a max-
imum distance below which the operator would declare
having observed a positive signal.
B. Defining a detection limit
Following [43], we can also determine LD, the mini-
mum detectable signal, viz. the minimal amount of signal
that could a priori be detected. For this purpose it is
first necessary to determine LC at a certain false alarm
rate α, as explained in the previous section. We then de-
fine a second confidence level β, controlling the amount
of type II error that we tolerate: β is the probability
that an existing reactor would be missed by our method.
With these definitions, LD is the average amount of sig-
nal that would lead to detection (i.e. observation of more
than LC counts) with probability 1− β. The solution to
this problem is found in [43]:
LD = LC +
k2β
2
(
1 +
√
1 +
4LC
k2β
+ 4
L2C
k2αk
2
β
)
. (2)
With these two quantities, we can explore the sensitivity
of our detection method. As for LC , LD can either be
converted to a power (if the distance from the reactor is
known) or to a distance (if the power of the reactor is
known). At known distance, the resulting power is the
minimum power detectable a priori with type I and II
error rates of α and β respectively. At known power, the
resulting distance is the maximum distance at which this
power would a priori be detected, with type I and II error
rates of α and β respectively.
C. Impact of known nuclear reactors
In this section we study LC and LD (or their conver-
sions to power/distance), as a function of the detector
mass, exposure time, clandestine reactor thermal power,
and the known nuclear reactor neutrino rate at any Earth
location.
Let us introduce a new luminosity unit, called the
r.n.u. (for reactor neutrino unit) and defined as 1 r.n.u. =
10
0.197 1030 MeV. With this unit, an experiment taking
data for T years with a total clandestine nuclear power of
P GWth. and with N 10
34 free protons inside the target
has a luminosity L = T P N r.n.u. The expected number
of events, N(L), at a distance L from a reactor, assuming
no - oscillation, is
N(L) =
〈σf 〉
4pi 〈Ef 〉
L
L2
≃ 230
(
T
0.5[y]
)
(
P
100[MW]
)(
N
1034
)(
1
L[km]
2
) (3)
The rate in equation 3 is then corrected for neutrino os-
cillations in all our calculations.
Figure 2 shows the neutrino rate world map at an op-
erating depth of 4,000 m. Correlated backgrounds, as
described in Section VI, turn out to be negligible at this
depth. We apply a 2.6 MeV visible energy threshold, re-
jecting accidental and geoneutrino backgrounds. Three
representative cases of the commercial reactor neutrino
rate levels can be identified: a low rate area, the south-
ern hemisphere, where the detector would detect < 500
events in 6 months, a medium rate area corresponding to
500 − 1, 000 events, and a high rate area corresponding
to > 1, 000 events or more, near clusters of nuclear power
stations in Europe, Japan, and North America.
Figure 5 (left) provides the maximum power of an un-
declared nuclear reactor consistent with the known neu-
trino sources. The graphics reads as follows: the horizon-
tal axis is the distance between the hypothetical clandes-
tine reactor and the neutrino detector, the vertical axis is
the known neutrino rate from commercial nuclear power
stations that could be related to an Earth location. The
lines represent the iso-power (MW) contours quantifying
the maximum power consistent with the known sources.
In all what follows we set a 10% false alarm tolerance
(type I error) as described in Section VIIA. In medium
background conditions we note that a 300 MW reactor
could be inferred after 6 months of observation with a sin-
gle 138,000 ton liquid scintillator detector located 300 km
away.
Figure 5 (right) provides the minimum power of a nu-
clear reactor detectable by the neutrino method as a func-
tion of the neutrino background and the clandestine re-
actor distance. The probability of missing an existing
reactor, or type II error as described in Section VIIB, is
set to 10% for the rest of this article.
D. Impact of non reactor neutrino backgrounds
In this section we discuss for the first time the impact
of the geoneutrinos and non-neutrino backgrounds on the
sensitivity of the neutrino method to detect undeclared
nuclear fission activities.
The map of Figure 4 illustrates the background rates
at a depth of 2,500 m that would arise by lowering the
detection threshold to 1 MeV (visible energy). This can
be compared with Figure 2. At distances of more than a
thousand kilometers from nuclear power station clusters
the rate is dominated by geoneutrino events. Extrapol-
ing from Figure 5 (left) we see that geo-neutrinos would
prevent the detection of any reactor of <1 GW with a
detector located at > 300 km in the medium commerical
neutrino rate regions. This further justifies the choice of
setting a 2.6 MeV visible energy threshold.
The influence of backgrounds on the sensitivity to
rogue activity is illustrated on Figure 6, as a function
of the operating depth and of the expected neutrino rate
from nuclear power stations. In this case we assume the
existence of a 300 MW rogue reactor. We first notice
that for known neutrino source rates of more than a few
thousand events the sensitivity is weakly affected by the
operating depth below 500 mwe since the non-neutrino
background rate remains a small fraction of the total
neutrino-like rate.
The evolution of the clandestine activity detectability
with respect to the operating depth is illustrated on Fig-
ure 6 (left). In medium background conditions we note
that a 300 MW reactor could be inferred after 6 months
of observation with a single 138,000 ton liquid scintillator
detector located 300 km away, only if the depth is greater
than 1,500 m. We note that the detection distance would
be degraded to 200 km at a depth of 600 mwe. According
to our background model we conclude it is not necessary
to deploy a detector module below 2,000 m. This is one
of the main results of this article.
E. Scaling up the detection volume
Having developed a compehensive background model
we now study the limitation of the neutrino method by
scaling up the exposure. This could be done either by
enlarging the size of the detector modules, or by op-
erating several detector modules simultaneously, or by
increasing the operating period. The potential appli-
cation could be the surveillance of low power research
reactors of a few tens of MW. Let us consider an expo-
sure of 5× 1034 H.year, ten times more than our baseline
case. This could be realized with five detector modules
of 138,000 tons operating for 1 year. Results not con-
sidering non-neutrino backgrounds are displayed on Fig-
ure 7 (left). For a typical southern hemisphere location
(3,000 events from known neutrino sources) we conclude
that this system would be sensitive to a 50 MW reactor
from a distance of 200 km. The right panel of Figure 7
(left) shows how the sensitivity evolves with the operat-
ing depth, still allowing the detection of a 75 MW reactor
at a distance of 150 km with detectors operating under
750 m.
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FIG. 5. Clandestine nuclear reactor power (MW) detectable with the neutrino method accounting only from known neutrino
sources. (left) Maximum power (in MW) of an undeclared nuclear reactor consistent with the known neutrino sources as a
function of the reactor distance (km) and neutrino rate from commercial nuclear power stations, as described in section VIIA.
We set a 10% false alarm tolerance. (right) Minimum power (in MW) of an undeclared nuclear reactors that could a priori
be detectable by the neutrino method as a function of the neutrino background and the reactor distance (km), as described in
section VIIB. The false alarm rate is 10% and the probability of missing an existing reactor is 10%. We consider an exposure
of 0.5 1034 H.y. Wiggles in the range 50-150 km are due to neutrino oscillations.
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FIG. 6. Impact of the non-neutrino backgrounds on the sensitivity to undeclared nuclear fission activity. The horizontal axis
provides the operating depth of the neutrino detector, in kilometers of water (kme). The vertical axis represent the known
neutrino source rate, for an exposure of 0.5 1034 H.y. Assuming a 300 MW undeclared reactor the panel contours describe
the iso-minimum distances (km) at which the signal from the clandestine reactor is consistent with the expectation. At closer
distances the neutrino detector could tag the clandestine activity. The right panel shows the maximum distance (km) at which
one could a priori verify the consistency of the signal with the 300 MW reactor hypothesis.
VIII. CLANDESTINE REACTOR
LOCALIZATION
The strategy developed in this article is to deploy a
detector as close as possible to a suspicious area to find
evidence of clandestine activity. If any evidence of clan-
destine activity is found, additional detectors have to be
deployed with the objective of finding the clandestine re-
actor’s location. Four detector modules (i=1,2,3,4) oper-
ating at four distinct locations at longitude and latitude
(λ,φ)i with a positive decision threshold are necessary
to isolate a unique location, inferring in addition the re-
actor’s power. We present here a simple optimization
algorithm providing an approximate position of the pre-
sumed clandestine reactor as well as confidence levels of
the clandestine reactor location, for the best fitted ther-
mal power. For simplicity we assume the reactor to be
constantly running.
Let’s assume the presence of an undeclared reactor
with a power P (MW) at a location (λ,φ)R. Si is the neu-
12
10
10
20
20
30
30
40
40
50
50
100
100
100
200
200
200
300
300
300
400
400
400
500
500
500
1000
1000
1000
Distance (km)
Ba
ck
gr
ou
nd
 (e
vt/
yr/
5.1
034
H
)
0 100 200 300 400 500 600
103
104
105
50 50
100 100
150
150
200
200
300
400
Depth (km water equivalent)
Ba
ck
gr
ou
nd
 (e
vt/
yr/
5.1
034
H
)
0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5 4
103
104
105
FIG. 7. Remote surveillance of low power research reactors with five 1034 free protons detector modules operating for one year.
The left panel shows the iso-maximum power lines (MW) consistent with expectation, as a function of the detector-reactor
distance (km) and the known reactor neutrino rate. The right panel describes the iso-minimum distance contours (km) at which
a 75 MW rogue reactor is consistent with all background expectation as a function of the detector depth (km) and known
reactor neutrino rate.
trino signal induced by the rogue reactor in the detector
i, drawn according to a Poissonian distribution of mean
Si. Bi is the expected background, including known neu-
trino sources as well as non-neutrino backgrounds. Back-
ground uncertainties are taken from Sections V and VI
and are added in quadrature. Oi is the observed value
in the detector i, following a Gaussian of variance Oi
(statistical error). The triplet (λ,φ,P)R is estimated by
minimizing the χ2 function:
χ2 =
∑
i
(Oi − Si(λ, φ, P )R −Bi)
2
Bi + Si(λ, φ, P )R
+
(P − Pexp)
2
σ2Pexp
(4)
Pexp and σPexp are set to 300 MW and 50 MW respec-
tively; in practice they would be set to values that best
represent typical rogue reactors.
With four detectors the ∆χ2 function follows a χ2 dis-
tribution with 3 degrees of freedom. However we fit the
thermal power at each point on the contour map, al-
lowing to derive the (λ,φ)CL confidence intervals at the
CL=68.3% (1 σ) and CL=95.4% (2 σ) by selecting re-
spectively the ∆χ2 = χ2(λ, φ) − χ2min=2.30 and 6.18
areas (2 degrees of freedom since PR is fitted at every
location). The second term on the right-hand side disfa-
vors large powers inconsistent with low power reactors. It
eliminates degenerate solutions located too far away from
the region of interest. Any further information providing
the thermal power would greatly enhance the localiza-
tion algorithm, with a possible reduction of the number
of detectors.
We notice here that a measurement of the neutrino en-
ergy spectrum distorsion due to neutrino oscillations in
the undeclared reactor’s spectrum observed with a detec-
tor located 70–150 km away could improve the precision
of the localization. This effect, already measured by the
KamLAND detector [31], would however require much
higher statistics from the undeclared reactor. We will
thus neglect it in our study.
The accuracy and robustness of the method depends
on the geographical location of the rogue activity. We
now consider three distinct cases: a penisula, an island,
and a flat shore. Though the true latitude and longitude
coordinates of our examples are hidden they correspond
to real cases. In each case the reactor is placed at the
origin of each of our coordinate system. In each case the
known neutrino sources amount of several hundreds of
counts per 1034 H.y corresponding to intertropical zones.
A. Peninsula
The first case assumes a 300 MWth clandestine reac-
tor located on a peninsula. Four detectors are deployed
1,000 m underwater 209 to 264 km away from the clan-
destine reactor. They operate for 1 year. Known reac-
tor neutrino rates provide 631 events in each detector
on average, to be compared with a mean rogue signal of
76 events. The clandestine reactor is clearly detected by
three of the four modules (see Table II). Figure 8 demon-
strates the ability to detect and locate the 300 MWth
clandestine reactor with four detector modules located
at an average distance of 250 km. In order to assess the
perfomances of the neutrino method we draw 1,000 ran-
dom trials of the peninsula experiment at various de-
tector operating depths: 500, 750, 1,000, 1,500, 2,500
and 3,500 mwe. We then reconstruct the reactor’s po-
sition and power. Figure 9 illustrate the reconstruction
of the reactor position with a detector immersed under
1,500 mwe. The spatial resolution, estimated as the 68%
quantile of the distance between the best fit position and
the true position, is D68%=55 km. Similarily the mean
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(λ,φ) Distance <S> <B> O Lc O-<B>
(-1.0◦,+1.6◦) 209 km 101 643 749 54 106
(+0.1◦,+2.1◦) 234 km 86 645 714 54 69
(+2.6◦,+0.2◦) 286 km 52 628 627 53 -1
(+1.3◦,-2.0◦) 264 km 63 610 714 53 104
TABLE II. Four detectors (each containing 1034 free protons)
are operating undersea at a depth of 1,000 m, for 1 year, about
250 km away from a 300 MW clandestine reactor located on
a peninsula. S is the rogue signal. B is the sum of the counts
from known nuclear reactors and non-neutrino backgrounds.
O is the observed value according to a random experimental
trial. Lc is the decision threshold value. O − Lc > B is the
detection criteria.
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FIG. 8. Localization of a clandestine reactor located on a
peninsula. Four detectors (squares) surround a 300 MWth
reactor (diamond). The triangle shows the reconstructed po-
sition at the best fitted power. The 68.3% (1 σ) and 95.4%
(2 σ) confidence levels are displayed. The thermal power at
best fit is P = 429 MWth.
reconstructed thermal power is 241±44 MW. Results are
various depth are presented on Table IV.
B. Island
The second case assumes a 300 MWth clandestine re-
actor located on an island. Four detectors are deployed
at a depth of 1,000 m, between 156 and 235 km from
the clandestine reactor. They operate for 1 year. All the
known neutrino sources provide 750 events on average,
to be compared with a mean rogue signal of 127 events.
The clandestine reactor is unambiguously detected by the
four modules (see Table III). In the example displayed
on Figure 10 its position is well reconstructed, a few tens
of kilometers from the true location. The thermal power
is well estimated, at 288 MW, attesting to the poten-
tial performance of the neutrino method in a favorable
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FIG. 9. Distribution of the distance (km) between the true
and the reconstructed positions for 1,000 trials of the penin-
sula experiment. In this particular case the detectors operate
at a depth of 1,500 m. The position is reconstructed within
D68%=55 km (dark gray area) in 68% of the cases.
case where detectors surround the suspicious location. As
(λ,φ) Distance <S> <B> O Lc O-<B>
(+1.5◦,+1.5◦) 235 km 86 772 816 57 44
(0◦,-1.4◦) 156 km 221 707 886 55 179
(-2.0◦,0◦) 221 km 94 743 826 56 83
(-1.0◦,+1.5◦) 200 km 107 779 922 57 143
TABLE III. Four 1034 free protons detectors are deployed at
an average distance of 203 km from an undeclared reactor
located on an island. Each detector operates under water at
a depth of 1,000 m, for 1 year.
for the peninsula case we randomly draw 1,000 trials of
the island experiment described above at various depths.
Figure 11 illustrates the reconstruction of the reactor’s
power with a detector immersed under 1,000 m of water.
The mean reconstructed thermal power is 254±63 MW.
The spatial resolution isD68%=43 km. Results at various
depths are presented on Table IV.
C. Flat Shore
In the third case we consider a flat shore geometry
spanning along the latitude axis, at a longitude of about
-0.4◦. We arbitrarily placed a 300 MW clandestine reac-
tor a few tens of kilometers inland. Four detectors are
deployed at a depth of 1,000 m for 1 year. All the known
neutrino sources provide 670 events on average, to be
compared with a mean rogue signal of 165 events. The
clandestine reactor is unambiguously detected by the four
modules (see Table V). In figure 12, we see 4 degenerate
solutions for the reactor location, the best fit position
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Peninsula Island Flat shore
Depth P/σ(MW) D68%(km) P/σ(MW) D68%(km) P/σ(MW) D68%(km)
500 mwe 211±188 271 249±153 196 193±122 197
750 mwe 226±136 239 265±99 82 220±106 186
1000 mwe 234±86 128 254±63 44 236±83 182
1500 mwe 241±44 55 244±31 32 266±61 113
2500 mwe 243±38 49 243±29 36 266±58 16
3500 mwe 242±30 47 242±29 32 264±56 16
TABLE IV. Results of simulation of 1,000 trials of the peninsula, island, and flat shore virtual experiments for detector depths
varying from 500 to 3,500 mwe. The determination of the power and reactor location becomes more accurate as the depth
increases until backgrounds become negligible compared to known neutrino sources.
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FIG. 10. Localization of a clandestine reactor located on an
island. Legends are similar to those of Figure 8. The thermal
power at best fit is P = 288 MWth.
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FIG. 11. Distribution of the reconstructed power for 1,000 tri-
als of the island experiment (1,000 mwe). The mean recon-
structed power is 254±63 MW.
being reconstructed a few kilometers from the true re-
(λ,φ) Distance <S> <B> O Lc O-<B>
(-1.2◦,+0.6◦) 146 km 269 676 910 55 233
(-1.3◦,-0.8◦) 169 km 168 661 766 54 105
(-0.9◦,-1.6◦) 200 km 107 655 746 54 91
(-0.9◦,+1.5◦) 191 km 117 687 766 55 79
TABLE V. Four detectors containing 1034 free protons are
located at an average distance of 177 km from an undeclared
reactor located close to a flat shore. Each detector operates
under water at a depth of 1,000 m, for 1 year.
actor location. We interpret it as the impossibility to
surround the true reactor location in this flat shore con-
figuration. Fortunately in this case the three solutions
reconstructed to the west of the detectors lie in the sea
and can thus safely be rejected. A possible way of im-
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FIG. 12. Localization of a clandestine reactor located on an
island. Legends are similar to those of Figure 8. The solutions
to the west of the detectors are naturally excluded since they
are located in the sea. The thermal power at best fit is P =
250 MWth.
proving the localization is the reduction of the sources of
backgrounds. At fixed reactor location one can only con-
sider operating the detector deeper. Table V shows how
the localization accuracy varies with the detector depth.
At a depth of 2,500 m or deeper the position of the re-
actor is reconstructed within 15 km in 68% of the cases.
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We notice that the reconstructed thermal power varies
from 193±122 MW to 264±56 MW when the operating
depth ranges from 500 to 3500 mwe, thus leading to a
significant reduction of the uncertainty.
If more than one plausible solutions still exist with the
four deep detector deployement, additional detector mod-
ules, or moving the existing modules in the fleet would
be necessary to eliminate the degeneracies.
IX. CONCLUSION
In the revival of the nuclear era new technologies may
be used to enforce the surveillance of nuclear activities.
In this article we discussed the futuristic option of using
very large neutrino detectors to detect clandestine nu-
clear reactors. In comparison with the previous studies
of [4, 5] we considered detector modules of 138,000 tons,
fitting inside an oil supertanker, and using liquid scin-
tillator technology This corresponds to three times the
volume of the largest neutrino detector ever built in the
1990s [16]. The development of such a detector is not
unrealistic within the next 30 years – not taking into ac-
count financial constraints. The main technical challenge
would be the deployment and operation of such a huge
detector underwater.
Our simulation concept, called SNIF, allows us to as-
sess the detectability of any clandestine nuclear reactor at
any Earth location. All known reactor neutrino sources
have been included in our simulation, including geoneu-
trinos. For the first time we provide a phenomenological
model of non-neutrino backgrounds based on the scaling
of recent reactor neutrino experiment results. In addi-
tion we modeled the non-neutrino background evolution
as a function of the detector’s operating depth. Beyond
previous studies which only consider immersing detectors
below 4000m of water [4, 5], we found that large neutrino
detectors could also be deployed at depths ranging from
500 m to 2,000 m of waters. As an example a 300 MW
reactor could be detected after 6 months of observation
with a single detector located 300 km away, operating at
a depth greater than 1,500 m. Using five detector mod-
ules for 1 year a 50 MW reactor could be detected at
200 km.
Beyond detectability, we addressed the possibility of lo-
calizing clandestine nuclear reactors with four detectors.
The precision at which we reconstruct the longitude, lati-
tude, and power of the reactor depends on the geographi-
cal situation. We considred three typical cases of reactors
located on a peninsula, an island, or on a flat shore. Lo-
calization of 300 MW nuclear reactors within a few tens
of kilometers is possible in such conditions. In these cases
the thermal power could be reconstructed within 50 MW.
However correlations between reconstructed power and
location may lead to degenerate solutions that are can
only be lifted with additional detectors or extra informa-
tion.
Our study attests that 138,000 ton neutrino detectors
have the capability to detect and even localize clandes-
tine reactors from across borders. However we conclude
that clandestine reactor neutrino detection would face
formidable obstacles to implementation.
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